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Summary
;
Recent work by Richard Roll has challenged the worth of portfolio performance
measures based on the capital asset pricing model. This paper demonstrates
that Roll's conclusions are due to his inappropriate use of a "truly" ex-ante
efficient index. Using a choice and information theoretic framework, an appro-
priate index is shown to be efficient relative to the probabilities assessed
by the "market." Residual analyses and portfolio performance tests, using such
an index, yield meaningful results for a v^ide class of information structures.
Roll's primary criticisms, however relate to tests of the model itself. We
argue that these criticisms are vastly overstated.
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PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE, PJISIDUAL AJNALYSIS AND CAPITAL
ASSET PRICING MODEL TESTS*
David Mayers
Edward M. Rice
I. INTRODUCTION
Richard Roll's [1977] criticism of the capital asset pricing inodel
presents an exciting intellectual challenge. We have foiind especially
challenging his conclusions concerning the use of the security market
line as a benchmark for asset or portfolio performance and for residual
analysis. These conclusions do not depend on the asset pricing model
being invalid. Nor for the main part do they depend on the market port-
folio identification problem. Roll's conclusion (10) summarizes his
objections on these points:
Deviations from the return/beta linearity relation are frequently
linked with some other phenomenon. The validity of such linkages
is criticised using tha Jensen measure of portfolio performance
as an example. If the 'market' proxy used in the calculations
is exactly (not significantly different from) ex-post efficient,
all of the individual Jensen performance measures gross of expenses
will be identically (not significantly different from) zero. They
can be (significantly) non-zero only if the proxy market portfolio
is (significantly) not efficient. But if the proxy market port-
folio is not efficient, x*^liat is the justification for using it as
a benchmark in performance evaluation?
*We have benefitted greatly from the thoughtful comments and suggestions
of L. Dann, M. Jensen, C. F. Lee, J. Long, R. Roll, C. Smith, R. Verrecchia
and an anonymous referee. Responsibility for the content of the paper,
of course, is ours.
^Roll [1977, p. 132].
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ITils statement is explicitly critical of the use of the security market
line as a benchmark for asset or portfolio performance. If one agrees
with the point being made in the rhetorical question, that the benchmark
portfolio should be efficient, then the statement is strongly critical.
It effectively eliminates the usefulness of the security market line as
a benchmark. In a companion piece Roll [1978] criticizes in detail the
accepted methodology of portfolio evaluation. -
Our discussion has focused on Roll's conclusion (10). This is
justifiable because (a) most of what we have to say concerns this con-
clusion and because (b) this conclusion is the most damning. It is the
most damning because it implies that the theory has little operational
usefulness, even if the theory is valid.
Empirically validating any economic theory is a difficult task. And
it is in this area that Pvoll's [1977] contribution must be considered as
paramount. His analysis is primarily concerned with problems associated
with the testability of the theory. His conclusions based squarely on
the mathematics of the efficient set are unassailable. However, his
conclusion (4) we consider severe:
Tlie theory is not testable unless the exact composition of the
true market portfolio is knoxra and used in the tests. This
implies that the theory is not testable unless all individual
assets are included in the sample.
The importance of Roll's criticism should be self-evident. Few
economic theories have attained the level of operational elegance achieved
by the Sharpe [1964], Lintner [1965] and Black [1972] models of capital
asset pricing. The theory has been directly applied in a large number
Sloll [1977, p. 130].
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and variety of empirical studies. Tests of capital laarket efficiency,
the effects of information events on share prices, the performance of
mutual fimd managers and the efficiency of other markets (e.g., merger
studies) are a sample of the variety of such studies. In addition, there
has been a plethora of related studies, for example, studies concerned
with the problems of measuring the asset pricing nodel's implied measure
of risk. One merely has to skim the title pages of the finance journals
over the past decade to become impressed by the central position assumed
by this model in the field of finance.
Our analysis is primarily concerned with the appropriateness of
using security market line for the purpose of evaluating portfolio per-
formance. Our approach is choice and information theoretic within the
framework of a general equilibrium capital asset pricing model. Our
analysis is unique in this respect. We define an individual as superior
with respect to the information he holds. We then query whether a security
market line (SML) analysis will correctly designate him as superior. This
is opposed to earlier analyses that define superiority with respect to a
given benchmark. In other words we try to answer the question concerning
the appropriateness of the benchmark.
Section II that follows contains a synthesis and discussion of Roll's
analysis. Our discussion introduces our primary objection— that Roll
does not allow for the possibility of superior performance. Section III
contains our choice and information theoretic analysis. We demonstrate
that the security market line can be a useful tool for detecting superior
An exception is Jensen [1972]
<
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perfonnance. In Section IV we examine residual analysis and conclude
that residual analysis is useful. In Section V we offer some thoughts
with regard to the problems associated with joint hypotheses and proxies
in asset pricing theory tests. We see little reason to either reject
the theory of asset pricing or the information provided by tests of the
theory solely on the basis of the existence of these problems. Section
VI concludes our study.
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II. A SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION OF ROLL 'S ANALYSIS
Roll's [1977] conclusion (10) is based on several statements derived
from the mathematics of the efficient set. To help understand Roll's
conclusion and our analysis, the following selected statements from Roll
[1978] are repeated,
S3: If the selected index is mean/variance efficient, then the
betas of all assets are related to their mean returns by
the same linear function,
S4: If, for some selected index, the betas of all assets are
related to their mean returns by the same linear function,
then that index is mean variance efficient.
86: For every ranking of performance obtained with a mean/variance
non-efficient indexj there exists another non-efficient index
which reverses the ranking.
These three statements are sufficient for an understanding of the
analysis leading to Roll's conclusion (10). The statements are true for
ex ante probability assessments as well as for ex post sample statistics.
Thus, for example, if the selected index happened to be ex post mean/
2
variance efficient, all individual assets and portfolios would plot
3
exactly on the security market line derived from the selected index (S3)
.
These statements are derived from the efficient set mathematics as
outlined in Roll [1977], The derived statements in Roll [1978], however,
relate more directly to the issue at handc
2
An index is ex post mean/variance efficient if it lies on the sample
efficient frontier derived from the realized average return vector and
sample covariance matrix. Why anybody would ever want to use such an
index is not obvious. Tb,e concept of ex post efficiency is without
economic content and the probability of an ex ante efficient portfolio
ever being ex post efficient most certainly would be small (what statis-
ticians refer to as a set of measure zero).
3
This assumes that portfolio returns are measured gross of any expenses
generated by the portfolio manager.
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No portfolio or asset could indicate either superior or inferior perfor-
mance using the securities market line criterion. If the selected index
happened to be ex ante efficient, there could be deviations from the
ex post security market line, but they would be statistically insignifi-
cant and would tend to disappear in repeated sampling over many intervals
(S3). Statements _S4_ and S6^ tell us that if we do find significant
deviations from the security market line, the selected index is not
mean/variance efficient and the deviation can tell us nothing about the
relative performance of portfolios or assets. These results are true
whether the portfolios under evaluation are constant composition port-
folios or portfolios of changing composition across time. That is, as
long as the selected index is ex ante mean/variance efficient for all
time intervals under consideration S3^ will rule whether the portfolios
are of constant or changing composition.
The above would appear to leave little room for positive statements
to be made concerning portfolio or asset performance; this is the point
of Roll's conclusion (10). For example, if in a securities market line
analysis one discovers significant deviations from the empirical line,
what can be said? One can say (for sure) that the index was not mean/
variance efficient (from S3), and S6 implies that any statements about
performance are questionable. On the other hand, a finding of no signi-
ficant deviations in an analysis is consistent with the index having
been mean/variance efficient in which case no portfolio manager or
See footnote 3 on previous page.
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investment adviser cdjld have; consistently pickad winners relative to
the benchmark. This finding v,oi_ila be consistent with tha simultaneous
hypotheses of capital narket efficiency and the index being mean/variance
efficient, but no positive trtatement about performance can be made.
Thus, Roll's conclusion ClO) concerning portfolio performance appears
sustained. Px.oll [i97'3. ". 1060] amplifi^.s this conclusion by stating:
Individual differeac-s in portroiio selection ability cannot be
measured by the securit les market line criterion. This was the
general thru?t of thri i^::ececiing arg^mi^nt. If the index is ex
ante mean/ variance efficient, th3 criterior -vHll be unable to
discriminate between miiners and losers, I': the index is not
ex ante efficie-it. the criterion vill desxgnate winners and
loserc; hut -.nother index ccuIq cause the criterion to desig-
nate different Tinners :md losers and thfcre is no cblective
way to ascertain whicn imdex is correct.
We claim the contrary 5 rhat Individual differences in portfolio
selection ability Cc... be -,-£a:=..red by tne s-^cu:. Lties niarket line criterion.
However, in ordtx to be able to detect superior perfort-ance, the possibilitj^
of such must be allowed. By assuming that th.. selected index is Eiean/
variance effi::ientf Tvitb resosct to the ::orrectly assessed efficien*" f-^n-
tier. Roll assuj33S away the ;,:^cssibility of cjperior performance."' He is
certainly right that, fclien sueh an iiidex is used as a benchmark, superior
Capital Market efficaJncy rsfa.;;, to etiiciency ia an infonaation sense
as opposed to a mean/" aiiauci sentie.
2
By individual c'irforancas j we pveBun-e Ru-^ ireans simply whether an
individual is dtsign^tac as z winner or a loser. We do not address the
issue of whathar msarin'-fui comparisons b?t ^een winners, for example,
can be made. Thare say ^e i- prchJea ussGciatea with comparing perfor-
mance between managers of portfolios with different risk.
3
The correctly atse^sed efxitienc frontier is derived using the prob-
ability density functions of nat-re's irreducible stochastic elements.
Thus, the correct-".y assessed efficient frontier correctly captures all
information that ±3 knoxvable.
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performance will be undetected. Under this assumption, superior perfor-
mance is impossible. This benchmark is efficient with respect to all
that is knowable—all probability distributions are correctly assessed
—
and consequently there can be no superior performance relative to this
benchmark.
An Jjiterpretation of mean/variance efficiency that allows superior
performance is as follows. We posit that the benchmark index is mean/
variance efficient relative to the joint probability density function
of returns assessed by the "market." We use the term "market" meta-
phorically as in Fama [1976, p. 168]:
Thus, in deriving testable implications of the hypothesis that the
capital market is efficient, we structure the world in terms of
a 'market* that assesses probability distributions on future prices
and then sets current prices on the basis of these assessed dis-
tributions. Strictly speaking, this implies that investors have
monolithic opinions about available information and act single-
mindedly to ensure that their assessments are properly reflected
in current prices. What we really have in mind, however, is a
market where there is indeed disagreement among investors but where
the force of common judgments is sufficient to produce an orderly
adjustment of prices to new information.
If the capital market is inefficient in processing information, the
joint probability density function of returns assessed by the market may
differ from the correct joint probability density function and signifi-
cant deviations from the empirical security market line may be observed.
Of course, if this is the case our index is not mean/variance efficient
with respect to the correctly assessed efficient frontier. However, with
this interpretation relative to the index we can designate winners in the
sense that those managers or advisers who plot deviations significantly
above the line are superior relative to "the market." Of course, if we
find no significant deviations, the simultaneous hypotheses of the capital
-9-
market being efficient in info rmit ion processing and the mean variance
efficiency of the index relative to market beliefs are sustained.
Another issue raised in the Roll [1978, p. 1060] quote above is con-
cerned with the sensitivity of ranking to the choice of index. This
issue follows directly from stat'Sment 6. It is true that choosing an
index that is inefficient relatrtf'e to the markets assessed efficient
frontier can yield incorrect performance evaluations and that another
similarly inefficient index coull reverse the rankings, Tne task of
choosing an index that is mean/variance efficient relative to the
appropriate set of beliefs is an important task. The capital asset
pricing model suggests that the value-weiglited market portfolio should
be such an index. We postpone uatil section V our discussion of prob-
lems associated with obtaining a good measure of the returns on the
market portfolio.
"This is the rub in tests of market efficiency. Any test is simul-
taneously a test of efficiency and of assumptions about the character-
istics of market equilibrium." Fair>a [1976, p. 137].
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III. PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
In this section we formalize our discussion and demonstrate that the
security market line can be a useful tool in detecting superior portfolio
performance. To do this, we presume an Individual with better information
than the market about some aspect of security returns and show he will on
average plot above the ex post security market line (SML). We are unable
to show this superior designation under completely general information,
thus the logical possibility of incorrect designation by the SML remains.
The conditions needed for proving correct designations are relatively
weak, however.
Previous analyses have assumed that a superior portfolio manager
plots above the security market line. In fact superiority has been de-
fined, "...as a portfolio whose returns are consistently greater than
those implied by its level of systematic risk." Roll's analysis calls
into question the assumption that superior performance implies and is
implied by plotting above the security market line. We define superiority
in an information sense. One individual is superior if he has better
information than others, llie question we then address is whether an
individual who meets our definition of superiority will be so designated
in an SML analysis.
A one-to-one correspondence in winner/loser designations between
information superiority and SML superiority would, of course, validate
the SML criterion. Less than a one-to-one correspondence does not imply
we should reject the criterion, however. That is, if the SML is useful
^Jensen [1969, p. 192]
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in showing superior performance under a wide variety of, but not all
conditions, the criterion can still be useful unless a better criterion
can be shown to exist.
At this point some discussion on the philosophy of the analysis to
follow is in order. We would like to have a completely general equilibrium
framework for analysis. The capital asset pricing model, for example, is
a general equilibrium model, but this framework assumes homogeneous beliefs
among market participants. Thus, we have a problem if we assume a capital
asset pricing model general equilibrium and we allow an individual to have
better information than that implied by the homogeneous beliefs that
establish the equilibrium. One way around this problem is to assume a
general equilibrium as used by Hirschleifer [1975], He assumes an economy
that is dominated by agents who share homogeneous beliefs and an individual
with deviant beliefs. The deviant belief individual is assumed to have
essentially "zero weight" in the economy. In reality, of course, if one
performs an SML analysis and detects superior performance, the assumed
general equilibrium model (CAPM) cannot literally hold. However, by
attributing very little weight to the deviant individual, it can hold
approximately.
Another way around the homogeneous belief problem is through the concept
of "consensus beliefs." This alterntive scenario allows for widely diverse,
heterogeneous beliefs on the part of asset traders. While the beliefs are
heterogeneous, the arrived-at prices represent some sort of consensus of
the market participants. That is, there is some probability belief, which,
if held by all traders, would result in the same prices as those currently
existing. This no-price-difference probability belief can serve as the
market assessment, if this probability distribution is multivariate normal
or if all investors ha.ve quadratic utility (more Important in the finite
states of the world model), prices are those arrived at in the CAPM with
homogeneous probability beliefs. The existence of a "consensus belief"
has been formally demonstrated by Verrecchia [1978],
2
Thus, we've outlined a scenario -wherein all individuals would not hold
the levered market portfolio, but assets would be priced consistent with
the CAPM, The pricing result is the important implication of the CAPM.
The implications of the CAR-I that all individuals hold levered market
portfolios is not important, aor is it consistent with the evidence anyway.
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The remainder of this section is divided into two parts, each con-
sidering a different level of information a portfolio manager might have.
Roll [1978] identifies two types of relevant information: (1) privileged
information about specific securities, or (2) information on general mar-
ket conditions. In the following part of this section we consider infor-
mation of type (1). In the second part we consider the general case,
xjhere the portfolio manager has information about both individual secur-
ities and the market return.
III.l A Model with Informed and Uninformed Individuals ;
Security Specific Information
Our model assumes an individual with better assessments than the
market about specific securities. We assume all individuals assess the
mean and variance of the market return identically. In particular, our
informed individual has access to an "information service" which gives
him one of L messages each period. After receiving any particular
message j = 1, ..., L, we represent the informed Individual's beliefs
as a vector
8=1
which represents the probabilities he assigns to the N possible states
of the world. We represent the market probability assessments (unin-
formed) as
v^e are here assimaing that the market (tt ) assessment remains stationary
over time. This is similar to the assumptions of most of the econometric
work on the CAPM.
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s=l
We can thus define any message j by its vector
s=l ^
which represents the changes in probability assessments associated with
message j
.
For our informed individus.!, there is also a probability distribution
2
for receipt of the various messages. We represent this as the vector
L
q = (q^, ..o q ) Z q = 1,
where q is the probability of receiving message j We further assume
that given any j
,
n-' 7^ but E"-(SjP = S (Rj^p, where E -^ is the
expectations operator on probability beliefs tt , E is the same operator
U
on IT , and R,, is the market rate of return. This assumption rules
out the possibility of no information while maintaining our assumption of
•3
security information only (no market information),^
The informed individual is our *'zero weight" deviant, thus prices are
as if the uninformed beliefs are homogeneous.
2
We assume, as in footnote 1 previous page, that this distribution is
stationary over time.
3
This is somewhat stronger than the assumption we need here, which is
that n ?^ for some j where q, > 0, VJe make this assumption for
analytical and expositor^/ convenience.
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We also assume that the informed and the uninformed have rational
expectations. This rational expectations assumption is clear in the
context of this model. That is, since the market never receives message
j, each period it maintains the prior probability assessment tt . Given
li U
message j, the informed individual has probability assessment ii ^ ir .
Yet both expectations can be rational, given the information available to
each agent if and only if
K
(A) Z q. ni = for every S.
j=l ^ ^
For if the informed expectations were "fulfilled," the unconditional
(on j) probability distribution would have to be
T' TT* TT A
(B) Z q TT ^ = Z q.(TT + n'') = Z q. it + Z q. n"'
j=l J j=l J j=l J j=i J
U ^ ^ j
= TT + L a . Tl'^ .
j=l '^
From (B), it is clear that if (A) does not hold, tt will not be the
observed unconditional distribution. Similarly from (B) , if (A) holds,
TT will be the observed unconditional distribution. Thus, we assume (A)
holds and the informed expectations are fulfilled. People all have
rational, but possibly different expectations.
We suppose that the market prices assets according to the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharp [1964] , Lintner [1965], and Mossin
[1966] in a complete market. We assume that investors have quadratic
utility (consistent with the CAPM) so that they select mean/variance
1 ;
efficient portfolios relative to their probability beliefs.
The quadratic utility assumption is used in the proof that follows
in that it insures that any individual with beliefs tt will optimally
hold some combination of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset.
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In a complete market, any portfolio K can be represented as a vector
where Y represents the units of consumption received by holding port-
KS
folio K if state s occurs. For any Individual i, we let U. represent
his utility conditional on state s occurring and U. represent his uncon-
ditional utility function. We assume that utility is separable such that
V^i'V ="i^V -^ \ ^'Uis^\s>•s=l
Here C, measures i's current consumption and Y. is the portfolio held by
individual i.
Also in a complete market, the Eollowing conditions must hold:
a) V = Z oj X for all securities r
r s rs
s
3U.(c.,Y^) au,(c.,Y^)
b) ^^-—^ / 3c.
is 1
i ^^is^^is^ ^'-^i^^i^
= T[ TT^ / rr for all individuals i.
IS i
Condition a) states that the value oC the rth security, V , is the sum of
the priced payoffs, where (jj is the price of a contingent claim on a unit
of consumption in state s and X is the total payoff (in units of con-
sumption) of security r in state s. Condition b) notes that in equilibrium
all individuals equate their marginal rates of substitution of future
expected consumption for current consumption to the relevant state con-
tingent claim prices.
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Having completed our choice and information theoretic framework we
now proceed with the analysis. Our concern is with the following theorem:
Theorem— If investor I's probability beliefs are correct, he will on
average plot above the security market line as drawn by the uninformed
investors. An equivalent way of stating this would be that investor I
expects to plot above the security market line drawn by the uninformed
investors. Symbolically, the statement of the theorem is
e\r^) > R^ + [E^V - RpjB^,
where E (R ) is the informed investor's unconditional expected return
from his portfolio, R-p is the risk free rate, E (Rv.) is the uninformed *s
expectation of the return on the market portfolio and is the
cov(R-|.,R^) /var(R^) as assessed by the uninformed.
Proof—We first V7ish to show that given any message j,
(1) E^^(Rj) > Rp + [E^'(Ej^) - Rpley,
where the Ij superscript indicates the expectation is with respect to
T-j
the probability assessment it , The U superscript likewise indicate
expectations with probability assessments ti . This condition has an
obvious relationship to the security market line.
The formal proof of condition (1) is in the Appendix. The condition
is established by constructing a hypothetical uninformed individual with
the same utilty function and current consumption choice as our informed
individual. We show the informed individual buys more future consumption
than does the uninformed in states where his probability assessments are
-17-
larger than are the lininformed's (n = rr ^ - tr > 0). Likewise he
buys less than the uninformed in states where his probability assessment is
less. We then show that the informed individuals because his probabilities
are correct, earns a higher average return than the uninformed expects
him to. Since the uninformed individual expects him to plot directly on
the security market line, using the uninformed estimate of beta, the
informed individual will beat the security market line.
Condition (1) is a conditional expectation and the theorem is con-
cerned with the unconditional expectation. The unconditional expected
return of the Informed's portfolio, E (R-p), is obtained by averaging
condition (1) over messages:
(2) E^(Rj) = I q E^h^j) > Rp + [E^Cy " Rp] ^ q^ 6^ .
j=l ^ j=l -' -^
This proves the theorem if the uninformed investors estimate the port-
folio beta of the informed individual as the average of his single period
portfolio betas
c
The Time Series Estimation Problem , In fact, however^ the uninformed
investor is likely to use econometric techniques to measure the informed
individual's beta. We nox-^ proceed to prove the theorem if this economet-
rically estimated ex post beta, B , is used by the uninformed investor.
The econometrically estimated beta vzill be
E
cov(R^,y
^I ~ 2
(3)
^
q^[E^^(Rl,V -E^(R^.)E^y3
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2
using the rational expectations assumption, where a (R^) is the variance
of the market return assessed with the uninformed beliefs. Since the
informed individual has no information about the market, his expectation
of the market return and the variance of the return assessed with his
beliefs will be the same as the uninformed mean and variance. This .
reduces equation (3) to
(4) 6^ == E q. ejj .
A necessary assumption for the proof is that
^ D ^ I
z q. 3" = I q. g::. .
j=l J ^J j^l ' ^J
Here, g is the covariance of the informed individual's portfolio return
with the market return divided by the variance of the market return,
assessed with the (uninformed) ir distribution, B is the same ratio
assessed %rf.th the (informed) ir expectations. This assumption is then
that the average beta of the informed individual's portfolio is the same
whether assessed vrith the informed or uninformed expectations. The assump-
tion will hold when information is in some sense "symmetric" with respect
to market returns; i.e., there is as much information (n deviation)
about high market return states as about low market return states. We
will discuss the effects of relaxing this assumption later in this section.
Thus, we assume that the average beta using the informed's expecta-
tions will be equal to the average beta using miinformed expectations.
This, combined with equation (4), establishes that
-19-
(5)
E U
5^ = E q, B^.j and thus
I
^ 3 Ij
E^(V > R^ + [E^y - Rp]3^
from (2).
This proves the theorem in the case where the uninformed investors use
time series regression techniques to estimate the informed investor's
portfolio beta.
We can now discuss the effects of relaxing the assumption that the
average B must equal the average 3-,^^ Without this condition, the
Ij ij
above proof will not go through and we can not generally support the
standard security market line analysis using an econometric beta, How^
ever, a modification of the econometric technique can still be used to
make unambiguous statements about portfolio performance.
That is, instead of estimating the beta of the portfolio of the
informed individual through time series analysis, we can use the betas
of the individual securities composing his portfolio by weighting these
individual security betas by the informed individual's portfolio weights,
U
In a particular period, we arrive at an estimate of g for that period.
The condition will not hold for all information possibilities. In
particular, consider a situation where the information in message j is
only about favorable states of the world; that is, r, ^ only when
X > E (X ) . Here, the informed individual's expectation of his return
will be greater than the market's expectation of his return only when the
market return is greater than average. This must result in 3-^. being greater
than 3y^. If this condition holds for all messages, then the average
5ij must be greater than the average 3^^ f„^ .^^^^ individual.
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Averaging these single period estimates over time, we arrive at an estimate
of Z q, 3-,- . • From eqviation (2), we know that if we use this average 3
j J iJ
ij
in our portfolio performance test, we are able to detect superior perfor-
mance for the case of security specific information. Thus, using indivi-
dual security' betas and averaging as described above, we can obtain a
beta that validates the security market line criterion.
III. 2 General Information
Thus, with security specific information the informed investor will
be correctly designated in a security market line analysis. We now dis-
cuss the problem in the context of general information. Hence, we remove
the restriction that E (B-,) = £ ^^4^" '^^ stated at the beginning of
this section, with completely general information the possibility of
incorrect designation by the SJIL reirai.ns. In the remainder of this section
we derive a sufficient condition for jin informed individual, with general
information, to ba correctly designatsid in an SML analysis. We also
relate our analysis to a similar analj'sis done by Jensen [1972], Jensen's
analysis refers directly to a potential econometric problem that arises
in the framework of our analysis.
As shown in the AppendiXj if the informed individual's consumption
and wealth are constant across messagcis, condition (2) will hold:
In our scenario -essages are received across time. Consequently, we
are assuming the inforraed's consumption and wealth are time independent
as well as message constant. These assumptions seem to fade from reality,
but the reader should keep in mind that the assumptions are sufficient
for condition (2) to hold.
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This proves the theorem if the uninformed investors estimate the port-
folio beta of the informed individual as the average of his single period
betas. Thus, the sufficient condition for validating the security market
line benchmark, if the beta of the portfolio is measured as the average
single period uninformed beta, is that the portfolio manager with constant
wealth selects the same consumption regardless of the message.
The Time Series Estimation Problem . In this general case, however, we
have a very difficult tiua extending this proof to include the SML dravm
with the econometrically estimated beta, Wliere information was security
specific we were able to demonstrate the plausibility of a correspondence
between the econometrically estimated beta, g > and the average of the
single period uninformed betas. With general information this correspon-
dence is less plausible. For example, equation (3),
can no longer be interpreted as a weighted average of any one individual's
assessments. However, Jensen's [19 72] analysis indicates this econometric
problem is of little empirical relevance.
with E (PO = E (Sj.) the numerator of the right hand side of equation
(3) is a weighted average of GOV ~(B ,R^), but vrith the general infor-
mation assumption the right hand side includes uninformed expectations
as well as informed.
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Jensen's analysis of the tijne series estimation problem associated
with assessing performance focuses initially on the situation where the
informed investor has information about expected market conditions only.
Under his assumptions, the optimal adjustment of a portfolio manager to
information about the market return involves setting
^it = h " ®i\
where G (> 0) is a parameter that depends on the risk aversion of the
informed individual and his confidence in his prediction of the market
return^ and it' is the difference between his expectation of the market
return in period t and the uninformed expectation. Since E(7r') is zero,
g is the average beta of the informed investor's portfolio.
Jensen goes on to shot'/ that this optimal adjustment will normally
2
result in an econometric overestimate of g^. That iSj
Plim l^ = gj + 0jP^E^\s^ ~ Rp
where p is the correlation between E (Py) and the obsei"ved R, (across
time). Thus, if the informed individual has any predictive ability (p > 0)
,
we have simplified Jensen's analysis for the purposes of our paper. In
particular, we have assumed 7r=^ = tt! in his terminology (or that the
u t
informed forecasts are "optimal") and have translated his terminology
and symbols into our framework where possible. Also, note that 0_ is
assumed independent of t in this formulation. It is at this point that
Jensen implicitly introduced the same assumptions that we do; i.e.,
those constraining the informed individual's wealth and consumption to
be the same across time.
we assmne here and in what follot-zs that E(7r') = 0, or that the
forecasts are "symmetric" about E(Py) . This makes the exposition and
results much simpler.
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his beta estimate will be biased upward; only ^Aere he has no ability
whatsoever (p = 0) will the econometric estimate of beta be unbiased.
This problem of bias in the beta coefficient has consequences for
portfolio performance evaluation. Again^ Jensen shows that the manager's
ability to predict will result, in an econometric estimate of his distance
above the security market line as
Plim 6 = 6^ -f 8jP^a^(B^,,) - 0^p^[E^(Rj^ ~ R^)]^
where 6 is a measure of the superior performance due to the informed
individual's ability to predict returns on specific securities. Jensen
2 7
goes on to shor^ that the second term. 9^p a~CSy,} , is the correct mea-
surement of the excess return the portfolio manager receives for his ability
to forecast the market. Tnus, the informed manager's estimated performance
will be biased downward by the last term and any superiority vjill be
understated. In fact, if cfR,,) < E (E., - 5-,-,) , the portfolio managerM Mr
would show up econometrically as having Ti/orse performance than if he could
not predict the market return at all! However, from an empirical stand-
point this possibility is uninteresting.
What then have we been able co show? For a broad classification of
information, security specific, we have shotm a one-to-one correspondence
between information superiority and SML designation. This one-to-one
Fisher and Lorie [1570] report the post World War II (1945-1965) standard
deviation of annual rates of return on the arithmetic index of NYSE stocks
as .197. They also reported the average annual rate of return on this
index over the same period as .138. If the average riskJLess rate was
TT
above .04 over this period theri an estimate is that oCR^) ~ 2E (R, - R-r,)
.
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correspondence can obtain using standard time series estimation proce-
dures. We have also shown sufficient conditions for correct designation
in the general information case. Jensen's analysis indicates that,
despite a downward bias, standard time series estimation procedures yield
the correct designation here as well. The possibility of incorrect desig-
nation in the general information case remains. However, the sufficient
conditions for correct designation are not so strong as to reject the
SML criterion or its useftilness for the general information case. Our
analysis does not indicate that inferior nianagers will be incorrectly
designated; only that a possibility of incorrectly designating a
superior manager exists.
An inferior manager would be one with no information advantage who
generates expenses, or one whose information advantage is outweighed by
the generated expenses.
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IV. ON RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
As mentioned in the introduction. Roll's conclusion (10) can be
easily interpreted as being critical of the empirical Kethodology known
as residual analysis. In this section we address the issue of the use-
fulness of residual analysis as an empirical tool. We find, first, that
only a very special, inappropriate index would be unable, as Roll suggests,
to pick up deviations from the security market line. Second, we show
that residuals coicputed against the market index vjill be appropriate if
assets are priced according to the capital asset pricing model.
Residual analysis is an enipirical laethodology designed to raeasure
the effects of information events on security/ prices. The effects are
measured by comparing a security's return when the information event
occurs to the ex ante expected return. As such, the problem of residual
analysis differs from the problem of portfolio evaluation in an important
way. Portfolios of securities selected by Investment managers are selected
ex ante. Presumably the managers have expectations of superior future
performance. Contrarily, residual analysis involves an ex post selection
rule. That is, a security is picked for a residual analysis "portfolio"
because some event specific to that security has occurred and the desire
is to determine the effect of the event on the price of the security.
Thus, even if the index used were mean-variance efficient with respect
to all information available at the beginning of the period, positive
and negative deviations would be detected by a security market line
type residual analysis. It appears that onlj^ if the index were ex post
efficient in a very special vaj". as we shall explain below, would these
deviations be undetected.
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Looking at the specifics of residual analysis should help clarify
this point. Let us examine, then, the two factor niarket model type of
residual analysis as performed by Mandelker [1974], Jaffe [197A] and
others. This methodology requires the estimation of the security market
line for each date residiials are desired. Historically, this estimation
has been accomplished by regressing a portfolio return vector on a vector
of the associated portfolio betas for each date. The estimated regres-
sion coefficients are used as the parameters of the security market lines.
To perform the residual analysis betas are calculated for each security
in the residual analysis portfolio.. Then residuals are estimated using
the calculated betas, the securities' returns and the regression coeffi-
cients. If y and v, are the estimated regression coefficients for a
ot It
particular date, a residual, e , is estimated for a security r in the
portfolio as
e = R - Y - y., 3 ,
rt rt 'ot 'It r'
where R is the realized return of security r in period t and 8 is
rt r
the estimated beta from the previous period.
Roll's mathematics tells us that all deviations from the security
market line are zero if an efficient portfolio is used as the index. The
required index need be efficient relative to the observed expected return
vector and the same variance-covariance matrix used in computing beta.
See Fama and MacBeth [19 73] for the details. The portfolio return
vectors are from the dates of interest, and the vectors of portfolio
betas are always estimated from sample periods prior to the dates of
interest.
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In residual analysis, returns for specific time periods are \ised and
betas are not calculated over these saiDe tiiue periods. Thus, to apply
mathematical identities to get zero residuals in the analysis described
above, one must employ an index that is mean/variance efficient
(1) treating the realized return vector for period t as the
relevant average return vector; and
(2) treating the sample covariance matrix of the previous
period (on which betas are measured) as the relevant co-
-'^ ' variance matrix.
Such an index would thus involve a special form of ex post efficiency.
Why one would advocate the use of this index is unclear. As stated
earlier, the security market line is used in residual analysis to compute
the ex ante expected return on a security (before an information event).
Using any type of ex post efficient index will be inappropriate for
yielding this ex ante expected return.
Having established our first conclusion of this section we now pro-
ceed to show that residual analysis j using the market portfolio as the
index, is valid. This, of course, is contrary to the criticism implied
2
by Roll's conclusion (10).
Our model is essentially that of the last section. We assume that
all individuals in the economy are initially uninformed, Ve assume further
that the market prices assets according to the capital asset pricing model
Furthermore, this same covariance matrix must be used in calculation
of the betas that are put into the cross sectional regression yielding
Y and -y .Ot 3-t
2
Roll's most recent paper [1978] does recognize that residual analysis
is valid under certain conditions.
and efficiently processes all information available at the beginning of
the period. The expected return-risk relationship is thus
s rs
^''^V = JirY- - 1 = S -^ tE^^V - ^^ ^r •
s rs
s
where R is the return on security r, X is the payoff of security r
in state s, and 3 is the market's assessment of the beta of security r.
r
With this scenario the market portfolio is truly ex ante efficient. During
the period, an Information event occurs that changes the correct probability
distribution to it . Residual analysis is concerned with firm specific
information, hence we retain the assumptions that E (E^) = E (R^) and
thata^CV =a2(y.
Let us now examine the residuals we should expect in this model using
the market portfolio as the index. By arguing as in section III.l, the
expected residual, e , will be
s s rs
_
_s
V
r
where V\ is the value of security r. This equation seems to give us
exactly what we desire in a residual, the difference between the expected
,Z Tr-"^ X .
(^ s rs)
return given the information event — and the ex ante expected
U r
,Z ir X ,
(g s rs)
return
=p .
r
See the proof in the Appendix to section III.A for the development of
the formula.
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Addltional intuition about the residual can be gained by rewriting
our last equation as
E^(e .) - ^ cov*(ri ,X )
vz \ s' rs
r
where cov* indicates a sample covariance and n represents, as in section
3
III, the change in probability of state s due to the ^formation event.
Tliis residual will then be expected to be positive or negative as this
sample covariance is positive or negative.
Notice now that the covariance will be positive for favorable infor-
mation and negative for unfavorable inforination. That is^ favorable infor-
mation should show increases in the probabilities (high n ) of high payoff
s
states for the security (high X ) ; it should also show decreases in the
probabilities (lox-? t\ ) of low payoff states (low X_ )c This should clearly
result in a positive covariance in the above equation, if the information
is favorable. One can show, analogously, that unfavorable information
will result in a negative covariance^
Thus, if assets are priced as in the capital asset pricing Hiodel.
residual analysis will measure the effects desired, A favorable infor-
mation event for security r will general!}' be associated v/ith positive
residuals for that security; an unfavorable information event will generally
be associated with negative residuals. Furthermore, the expected residual
for a period with an information event will be the change in the expected
return caused by the new information.
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V. ON TESTS OF THE ASSET PRICING MODEL
At this point in the paper we have accomplished our primary inten-
tions, and we now turn to Roll's [1977] conclusion (4) which we consider
severe. Roll preludes his [1977] study with the following:
If the horn honks and the mechanic concludes that the whole
electrical system is working, he Is in deep trouble ...
Pirsig (1974)
As a prelude to this section we offer the conjecture that the honking
horn does provide sotpe information and that if the mechanic is prohibited
from further tests, he ought not ignore the information provided by the
proxy.
Roll [1977] identifies three problems with tests of the capital
asset pricing model:
a) The only testable implication of the model is that the true
market portfolio is mean-variance efficient.
b) The return of the true market portfolio is not used in any of
the empirical tests to date and is virtually impossible to
measure. The theory is not testable unless the exact value-
weighted market portfolio of all assets is used.
c) All tests of the model i.nvolve joint hypotheses, one of which
is that the market portfolio is correctly measured. Since we
know the market portfolio is not correctly measured, the re-
jection of the joint hypothesis tells us very little.
We sympathize with all 3 problems and believe they are all of some
importance. Criticism (a), especially, seems to have cleared up some of
This is our summary of his criticisms, which he states somewhat
differently.
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the confusion involved in earlier tests. However, criticisms (b) and
(c) impose extremely severe criteria on empirical work that few, if any,
econometric studies can meet.
Criticism (b) seems to say that no proxy for the market return will
suffice for testing the theory. Roll correctly suggests that the use of
a proxy variable increases tha risk of type I and type II error in testing.
Yet, it is almost impossible to find the "true" measure of any variable in
economics. Proxies must be used constantly to test all types of economic
theories. Are we to abandon studies of inflation because the change in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is merely a proxy for the inflation rate? Are
we to abandon cencentration studies because the 4-firm concentration ratio
is merely a proxy for the concentration of an industry? Are we to abandon
all empirical studies?
Clearly, Roll finds something especially worrisome about proxies for
the return on the market portfolio. But the only "special" problem he
discusses is that highly correlated proxies can yield different conclu-
sions about the validity of the CAPM» This problem is again, however, not
unique to CAPM tests. Consider, for example, the testing of a theory which
explains some variable Y as a function of inflation. Suppose the following
regression is run over N periods
,
Y = a + b(ACPI ) +u^
where ACPI is used as a proxy for inflation. Suppose further that the
Roll also discusses an econometric aggregation problem in the portfolio
grouping technique, but this is not a proxy problem. The aggregation
problem is again a familiar one to econometricians.
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results offer some support for the theory, with a significant t-statistic
2
on b and R = .25. Now, b>' the geometry of the situation, there must be
some other proxy for inflat:ion, correlated .866 with ACPI, which shows -no
2 1
relationship at all to Y (R = .00). This proxy can also be constructed
simply by assigning differemt weights to the price series that compose the
CPI, if we have N linearly independent price change vectors for indivi-
2
dioal goods. It seems that; this proxy and the many others like it have - '
exactly the same problem that Roll finds so worrisome in the market proxy.
Problem (c) is also a common one in economic hypotheses. That is, •
virtually all tests of economic models involve joint hypotheses. The
simple supply-demand model., for example, is not independently testable;
it must be tested in conjunction with some hypothesis about how one of
the curves has shifted. Orher models are tested jointly with, if nothing
else, the hypothesis that the data and variables used correspond to the
theory presented. In fact, linking the CAPM with this last hypothesis is
the joint hypothesis Roll finds so troublesome. '•
What we have done so far is to argue that the problems Roll sees in
the CAPM tests are also found in other econometric studies. Unfortunately,
this is not sufficient to refute, or even really minimize, his criticisms.
In fact, he is certainly correct in that a definitive test of the theory
Since R = .5 is the cosine of the angle between the Y vector and the
ACPI vector in N-space, the angle between these two must be 60 . Thus,
there is some vector, X, in the same plane as Y and ACPI that is 30 from
ACPI and 90° from Y. The correlation between X and ACPI will be
cos 30 = .866; the correlation between X and Y will be cos 90 = 0.
2
It may be that some goods would have to be given negative weights,
but this is the same problem Roll mentions in his criticism of Black,
Jensen, & Scholes.
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cannot be made without solving these problems. It is also unfortunately
true, however, that definitive tests are nearly always impossible.
We disagree with Roll in his almost total condemnation of all empir-
ical studies to date. Implying that they provide virtually no information
at all. We believe there is some information in these tests, even with
imperfect proxies testing joint hypotheses. More importantly, this
information is the best available. It does no good to ignore this infor-
mation without providing some better information in its place. In an
ideal world, these problems would not exist— and we would certainly sup-
port the creation of such a world, were it costless—but this provides
little justification for rejecting (ignoring) studies done in the world
in which we now live.
In fairness to Roll, he is moving in this direction in Part II of
his paper.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLTOING THOUGHTS
Our examination hcis been concerned with the empirical relevance of
the capital asset pricing model. In particular, we have explored the
worth of (1) tests of portfolio performance using the security market
line benchmark, (2) tesits of the effects of information events through
residual analyses, and (3) tests of the CAPM itself. We conclude that,
although there are potential problems with all three types of tests,
they are valid tests.
Superior portfolio managers are reasonably detectable in a properly
performed security market line analysis. Favorable and unfavorable infor-
mation events will be iiimilarly, on average, identified with positive
and negative residuals,. Thus, Roll's rhetorical question on the use of
an index that is not "truly" efficient is answered. The appropriate
index is one that is elrficient relative to the "market" ex ante beliefs.
If the market is not pirocessing information efficiently, the appropriate
index should not be truly efficient. Furthermore, the capital asset
pricing model tells us that the value-weighted market portfolio is
efficient relative to i;he market beliefs.
We sympathize with the criticisms offered by Roll concerning tests
of the CAPM itself. However, we have argued that these criticisms can
be leveled at virtually any econometric study. We conclude that the
tests provide some information about the validity of the model and should
not be dismissed out-oJ:-hand.
Finally, Roll's ciiticism should not be interpreted as a rejection
of the capital asset pricing model itself. One must replace this theory
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with an alternative theory that predicts better and/or is more useful
in order to invalidate the CAPM» Even evidence itself is not enough to
invalidate the theory. As Stigler [1966] puts it
The answer is that it takes a theory to beat a theory: If
there is a theory that is right 51 percent of the times it
will be used until a better one comes along.
In the case of the CAPM, it is far from clear what the suggested alter-
native is.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Condition (1)
We restate here condition (1) and conditions a) and b):
(1) E^^(Rj) > Rp + [E^Cy - Rj,3 g^^
a) V = Z u) X for all securities r
r s rs
s
SU,(C.,Y.) 3U.(C.,Y.)
^ . i i' 1 , X x' 1b) ^^ = _ / —^
is i
i ^^js^^iq'^ ^"i^^i^
= ir rlz; ^^— / rx for all individuals i.
s di
.
dC
,
xs i
We represent I's optiitial portfolio and current consumption, given
message j, as (Yt.^ , ..., Y'l ) and Cr. respectively. Condition b) means
XX XiM X
that
8U^(CJ)
.J^
SU^^(yJ^)
is Is
Now, let us construct a hypothetical individual U who holds beliefs
IT and has the same utility function ae I. In general, for the same
wealth as I, U will not select C;:*, = Cr.. However, we select wealth for
Ij I
.
U such that C^. = c4.
All notation is as defined in the text. To shorten this Appendix we
refer to the informed individual as I and the uninformed as U.
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For individual U also,
-
,
tor all s.
U s Us
However, with our assumptions of identical utility functions and C,, = Cz.:
u i
3G^ w 3Y,, u) 8Y^Is Us s Is
Using the last equality and rearranging yields
^"ls^'4s>
U
TT
s^^Is
^^•ls^4> s
^^Us
This result yields the following implications for quadratic utility (since
it is concave)
:
U Ij ,J vi
n > IT
-^
-> Y;i > Y-i
s s Us Is
Al / = TT^J -. Y^^, = yIs s Us Is
U li „i ,,1
TT < TT -^ -i- Y;; < Y-LSB Us Is
This gives us the condition
A2 (-n^^ - /XYi - Y,^, ) > 0, for all s
s s Is Us —
And if TT-^^ 7^ /, (tt-^^ - Tr^')(Y^ ' ^l ) > 0-3 s s s Is Us
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Individual I's expectation of his portfolio return is
J,
s Is s s Is s Is
A3 E^J CRJ = -^ -. 1 =
:;
+ ~ T- - 1
E ui Y^ Z oi yI Z u) Y^
s Is s Is s Is
s s s
Using the CAPM which we have assumed,
ZuV
s Xs
A4 E^CR^) = ^ — - 1 = R + [E^(R,) - R^] 3^,.
z 0) Yd: ^
J-J
s Is
s
From equations A3 and A4
Z (TT^J - /)YJ^
A5 E^^(R,) - (R, + [E^y - Ry^^) = ^
^
^ ^/
s Is
s
Z(it'^ -/)(yJ, - yJ ) Z(u^J - .")Y^^
s s Is Us s s Us
^s
Z w Y^ Z u Y^
s Is s Is
s s
We want to determine the sign of the right hand side. From CAPM theory,
because U's expectations are equal to those of the market, U's portfolio
must be a linear combination of the risk-free rate of return and the
market portfolio, i.e., there exist a, and a„ such that Y„ = a,, + a^X for
1 z Us Ls 2 s
all s where X = Z X is the total consumption available in state s.
s rs ^
r
Hence,
S S Us S ' S
s s
-i. s s z s s c
s s
Since iTr-^=l = ^Tr,
s s'
s s
(tt^-' - /)'4 = 4 2 ^"^-^^ .3 r ^•-'^
s sUs 2 ss 2 ss
s s s
s s
11 n
= O5 since E (Rw) = E"(R.) which we assumed.
Hence, from equation A5 ;_•
s Is
3
%
But, by condition A2 if ii 7^ tt for some s, the right hand side of
s s
A6 is greater than zero. Hence,
which establishes condition (1),
Demonstration of Condition (2) with General Information
Our assurcptlons are that the informed indi-zidual's consumption and
wealth are constant across messages. Formally these ass'jmptions imply;
^i = ^1
and E (i) Y^ = K = W - C".
s is I
s
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Condition. (2) is established by showing that
(2) E^(Rj) = S q.E^-'(Rp > R^ + [e"(R^) - R^J E q p" .
j=l ^ ' j=l
Tlie right hand side of equation A5 above indicates this will be established
if
JL. s s Us
A7 I q. ~ • ^ 21 OJ
1=1 -^ I 03 Y^
-•
s Is
s
since the first term on the right hand side of equation A5 xirill be posi-
tive when v/eighted and summed over q. by condition A2. By assumption
J
I, oi Yt = K and Y"! is constant across j. Consequently, the ninnerator
S xS US
S
of A7 is important: .
Z Q. Z(Tr"^ - T^ytl = E q. Z(-n^^ - it^') (a, + a^-'^ ).
. "'i s -Us ,1 s s 1 2 s
a, disappears as before and
Z q. l(7i^^ - n''y£l - a„ I a. X [I q.E-^^lR,,) - E^(Rj].
.
T s s us 2 S3, 1 :I MIS s J
Now, L q_.E'^(Rj ) = 'L (F^) i.,e,s the ui "onditional probabilities of I
and U ars the same. Thus, condition (?) for this case ^s established.
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